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LEADING QUESTIONS.
For obvious reasons interrogation of witnesses is necessary in
order to educe from them the information which they are able to
give to the tribunal.
But the use of interrogation is attended
with possible dangers. Instead of merely eliciting what is in the
consciousness of the witness, it may suggest to him what is not
there, and induce him through complaisance towards party or
counsel, through fear, through partisanship, externally to affirm
or deny what he.does not internally affirm or deny. It may even
induce the witness externally to substitute the suggested affirmation or denial, for the one which but for it, he would have made,
or for a state of neutrality, doubt and nescience in which he
would otherwise be.
A witness is usually called because the party calling him expects him to testify in a favorable way, in respect to a part, more
or less important, of his case. This expectation need not imply
any want of veracity and independence on the part of the witness.
It may have been learned accidentally or otherwise, that he believed and if interrogated would affirm that certain things had
been said or done; and for this reason he may have been called as
a witness.' That he allowed a party in some way to learn what
his testimony would probably be, is no warrant for supposing bim
to have any bias in favor of that party, and it is difficult to discover sufficient ground for suspecting that a man becomes so far
a partisan by reason of the fact that he is going to be called to
testify, that he would be under appreciable temptation to depart
from the facts, as they stand in his consciousness, in order to promote the interests of the party who calls him. If that be assum'Cf. remarks of Gibson C.J., in Ellmaker vs. Buckley, i6 S. & R., 72.
(1)
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ed, the very fact that a man appears as a witness, gives warrant
for suspecting him. He would not be called at hap-hazzard. In
some way his testimony must have been anticipated by the party
and if the witness is intelligent, and is called to a prominent fact
in the cause, he must see the bearing of his expected testimony
upon the issue. Tilghman C. J. well said in an issue devisavit
vet non in which a witness had been asked whether he considered the testator fit or unfit to make a will, "To be sure any witness
of common sense must know that his delivering his opinion in
favor of the testator's fitness to make a will, must have a tendency
to establish it in the minds of the jury." 1 The fact that a witness
knows that he is put on the stand by a party in order to prove a
given fact or series of facts, that he is therefore desired and expected to prove them, of course does not disqualify him.
There are many circumstances, dates, etc., however, whose
bearing the witness may not see or have been made to see, prior
to his public examination. Even if he had a bias towards the
party calling him, he would not realize how a given answer to a
question would affect the result, unless the fact that it would,
were in some way communicated to him. A proper aim of the
court would be to prevent any intimation of this sort. The questipner may indicate the answer he would like to get in various
ways; by his tones, gestures, frowns, smiles. He may do it by
words.
A "leading question" has, when defined at all, been defined
as one which is "so framed as to indicate particularly the answer
vhch -the plaintiff [or defendant as the case may be] wished" '
which is "expressed in such a manner as to indicate to the witness
the answer which it is wished he should make;"' from which "the
wites.cauld understand that the plaintiff [or defendant] wished
As to
hita to answer it in one way rather than another." '
whether a question was leading, Agnew J. said, "It clearly was
so -s it indicated just the answer the party desired." 5 "From the
authorities relating to this point, and the reason why leading interrogatories and the answers thereto are suppressed, and not
perinitted to be read in evidence," says Kennedy J., "the following rule on the subject, I take it, may fairly be deduced That

'Wogan v. Small, i i S. & R., 141.
2Snyder v. Snyder, 6 Binn. 483 Tilgman C. J.

3Selin
v. Snyder, 7 S: & R. 166, Tilghman C. J'
4
Wogan v. Small xi S. & R., 141, Tilghman C. J.
5Susquehanna Coal Co., vs. Quick 61 ,Pa., 328,341.
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whenever the interrogatory is couched in such terms as to indicate distinctly to the witness the answer that the party propounding it wishes him to give, it will be held leading."'
A question may be objectionable however, when it does not
in form indicate whether the questioner wants an affirmative or
negative answer, but when it furnishes to him material, which
his memory might not have supplied to him, to incorporate into
his answer, and thus induces the adoption by him of the memory
or imagination of the questioner or some one who hhs prompted
him.
"Nevertheless," says Wigmore, "such a question [one
put in the alternative, 'did you or did you not,' etc.,] may become leading in so far as it rehearses lengthy details which the
witness might not otherwise have mentioned, and thus supplies
him with full suggestions which he incorporates without any effort by the simple answer 'I did' or 'I did not'. Accordingly the
sound view is that such question may or may not be improper
according to the amount of palpably suggestive detail which it
embodies." '
Sometimes the question is so framed as to be answerable by
a yes or no, and that the answer yes is expected is indicated.
"Did you not hear Mr. Sheeler say that he did not care the devil
had the furnace, if he had his money, but that he was afraid he
would never get his money" [from Speer] the action being by
Speer against Sheeler, for slandering his solvency, is such a question.' The expression "did you not" indicates that an affirmative answer is expected. Mary Taylor, suing the executor of
her father on a note, and being made a witness b,y the defendant
was asked "Did you not tell Spiehlman, your brother-in-law,
some time before the death of your father * * * that you had
told your father what became of the note, that he should not
trouble himself about it, that you had destroyed it, or burned it,
but told SpiehIman you still had the note in your possession?"-a "leading question.'
A witness, called by plaintiff, on being
asked whether H superintended the erection of a scaffold, said he
did not remember. He was then asked "Did you not say to me
yesterday afternoon as follows: 'I did not superintend the con'Summers v. Wallace, 9 W. x61.
2 Evidence, page 865.
$Sheeler v. Speer, 3 Binn. 13o. Kennedy J. thought in Summers v. Wallace, 9 W. x6r, that a question "did he notsay" that he was only to hold a
certain mill site till he was paid for his trouble, was, without doubt, 1,.ading.
'Brubaker v. Taylor, 76 Pa., 83.

4
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struction of the building of this scaffold; H did that himself'?"
a question which is condemned because it "put in the mouth of
the witness the very allegations of fact which the plaintiff wished
him to verify by an affirmative answer"' A witness, expected
by the plaintiff, who called him, to say that an area-way was
dangerous, said the contrary. The plaintiff's counsel then asked
him if he remembered a conversation between the questioner and
T, in the witness' presence. He said yes. He was then asked,
"Do you not remember the other ?" [ i.e., his own expression of
opinion.] He answered, "I do not remember the other." He
was again asked, "Do you not remember of saying it was a dangerous place ?" His answer was, "No sir, I do not remember
of saying that." Cross-examination as to his remarks inconsistent with his present attitude, and by means of leading questions,
was justified by his being an unwilling witness and by the unexpectedness of his answer.'
The expectation of the questioner may be expressed when
the words "did younot," "did he not," etc., are not employed.
A question "whether Q asked Mc if his rights would be in
any manner affected by that suit [a suit then pending] and that
Mc replied that they would not, and that he [Q] might go home"
from the court, was leading. It showed that an affirmative answer was looked for.' Referring to a public sale of a piece of
land known as the Isle of Cue, a witness was asked "Did said
Bower asssign to you as a reason why he would not bid more for
the Isle of Cue, because he could buy Welling's land" equally
good, at a less price. The question was censured because it did
not ask the witness whether he had heard Bower say anything,
and if so, what, on a certain subject, but instead "the words
were put into his mouth." 4
Although a question is "whether or not" a certain thing, detailed, was said, or a certain thing, detailed, was done, it may be
leading in the objectionable sense. In an action by an executor
for the price of goods sold by him to the defendant, the defendant
alleged that the executor had agreed that a debt due to him from
the decedent, should be set off against the price of the goods.
The court properly refused to allow the plaintiff to ask "whether
or not, in a conversation between plaintiff and defendant, it was
'Fisher vs. Hart 149 Pa. 232.
2McNerney v. Reading City, 15o Pa. 61 i.
3Susquehanna Coal Company vs. Quick, 61 Pa. 333.
'Snyder v. Snyder, 6 Binn. 483.

THE FORUM
stated, or anything was said about, or to the effect that the price
of the property was to be credited upon" the decedent's debt, for
the purpose of contradicting the defendant. "The court very
properly said that the witness should be permitted to state what
occured in the conversation referred to, without having his attention called to any particular matter in the manner proposed."'
In an issue devisavil vel non a witness against the will who had
said the testator was generally under the influence of liquor or
opium, was not permitted to answer the further question "will
you state whether'or not, at any time, she was not able to converse with you?" because it was leading.'
"Did you" do, see, hear, etc., is a form of question which
may or may not be leading. Of the question "Did you ever acknowledge the deed made for the land in question to Anthony
Selin? How and when did you make the acknowledgment?"
Tilghman C. J. said it might "have been put in a more unexceptionable manner. Did you or did you not ever acknowledge the
deed? But I do not think that the form in which it is put is so
He
improper as to render it necessary to suppress the answer."
proceeds to say that a leading question is one which indicates the
answer which is wished, and that the above question does not do
this. The validity of an administrators' sale for debts was attacked by the heirs on the ground of the vendee's coercion of the
administrators. The witness was one of the administrators who
made it. Her signature and the acknowledgment of the deed
She clearly knew the bearing of
were already in evidence.
expected.' The answer was "I
answer
the question. and the
never acknowledged the deed in any other way than I have stated, that is. I said in the presence of F. Evans, Esq., that I signBut the question itself would not,
ed the deed to my.sorrow."'
answer. In an action on
the
expected
have
indicated
to another
was asked on cross-ex
of
the
company
agent
H,
an
fire
policy,
a
Barr
[the assured] in
to
Mr.
state
you
not
amination, "Did
one] would
[a
former
his
policy
that
Hertzler,
of
Mr.
presence
Barr rewhich
it?
to
soon expire and that he must not neglect
plied in the presence of Hertzler, 'Can't I fix it now as I intend
He replied,
going away and will not be home when it is due?' "
'Neely v. Barr's Exec. 157 Pa., 427.
2Messner v. Elliott, 184 Pa.. 41. In Seitz v. Seitz, 270 Pa., 71, a divorce
proceeding, the question "State whether or not your husband admitted to
you he had committed adultery with Mary Patterson ?" was leading.
3Selin v. Snyder 7 S. & R., i66.

6
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"I have no recollection of any such thing." Hertzler was later
called by the plaintiff and asked "Did Mr. H. state to Mr. Barr
in your presence that his policy of insurance would soon expire
and that he must not neglect it?" "Did Mr. Barr answer Mr.
H. by saying, 'Can't I fix it now, as I expect to be away, and
will not be home when it is due?' ". The answers to both were
"Yes sir." That the question was leading, is vaguely conceded,
and it is said, had they "been put .inthe alternative, [did or did
not Mr. H state; did or did not Mr. Barr answer] they would
have been entirely free from objection.'
It is perhaps difficult to distinguish the tone of meaning in
the question, "Did your father refuse to allow you.to go to church
and school ?" and that in the question, "Will you state to the
jury if your father refused," etc. In a prosecution for incest
with the daughter of the defendant, the object was to show that
he refused to let her go to church and school. The question by
the prosecution "Now Laura, will you state to the court and
jury if your father refused to allow you to go to church and
school" was rejected as "somewhat leading" and also the
question "Will you state to the court and jury what reason he
gave, if any, why he would not permit you to go to church or
school?" the court saying, "ascertain first, whether there was any
reason given by her father." 2
A question in the alternative, as just seen, is said not to be
leading. A question "was it or was it not made known to the
'board of directors [of a bank] at any time, by James Wilson or
any one else" that property on which a mortgage was offered to
the bank had been previously conveyed by him to-his wife or any
one else? and another, "Had you or not, as a director, any knowledge that Wilson and wife had made a deed for the property,"
etc., though objected to as leading, were properly received.'
In an action of case for swelling water back on plaintiff's land
by means of a dam, the defendant denied that plaintiff owned the
land. where the overflowing occurred. He asked a witness, "Did
'Farmers' Insurance Co. v. Barr, 87 Pa., 124. As the purpose was to
contradict H's denial that he had used certain words, it was proper to repeat these words to the contradicting witness and ask whether they had
been2 used.
Com. v. Bell, 166 Pa., 405.
3
Wilson v. McCullough 23 Pa., 440. Possibly the fact that the question
in a deposition was not objected to as leading, was a reason for refusing to
say that error had been committed.
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P. R. [a surveyor who ran the line] tell you where the corner
was ?" The answer was that P. R. told him the corner was in the
creek. The question was said not to be leading.' It did not suggest the answer that was given.
In an ejectmentin which the defendant claimed under a devise from Logan, the validity of which, for want of mental capacity to make it, the plaintiff denied, the defendant was allowed
to obtain a negative answer to the question put to a subscribing
witness, "Did you discover anything that indicated want of
mind ?" Rogers J. says there isnothing in the objection that it
was a leading question.
In assumpsit on a contract for work, the defendant testified
that plaintiff had agreed to furnith materials for the buildings.
His testimony was later read to the plaintiff, as a witness, and
he was asked to say if it was correct, and to give his own version.
The plaintiff had a right to give his own version of the contract
but whether using the testimony of the defendant as a means of
eliciting it was proper, whether the question was leading, was
not considered.'
In a slander case, a witness having said that the defendant
had said that the plaintiff would be broken up in a few days, was
asked, "Was it before you had made the promise against drinking spirits, or after, that you heard Mir. S express himself in the
manner you say ?" The answer was "After I made the promise. "
Tilghman C. J. saw nothing improper in either question or an4

swer.

In a suit by McKim for a debt, the defendant asked a witness "Did Capt. McKim tell you that he had received $1Q0 of me
in Wilmington and Brandywine money ? "His answer was "Yes."
It was not decided whether the question was leading. It had not
been objected to as such.'
Leading questions by a party are permitted to witnesses
called by the opnosite party. It seems to be assumed thai a
'Kemmerer v. Edelman, 23 Pa. 143. The question had not been objected to2 as leading.
Logan v. McGinnis 12 Pa., 27. But the question was not objected to
as leading, and 'Rogers 'J.says if it had been, the form of question might
have been varied.
3Corkery v. O'Neill, 9 Super 335. No objection had been made to the
form4 of the question.
Sheeler v. Speer, 3,Binn 130.
5McKim V'.Somers, i Pa. W. 297.
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witness has a bias for one who calls him, and a bias against the
one who does not call him, a disposition to say what the former
wants, and no disposition to say what the latter wants, a curious
estimate of human nature in the Anglo-Saxon world, but doubtless justified by observation. The cross-examiner therefore may
put leading questions, frame propositions minute as to details,
and indicate clearly that he wants an affirmation or a negation.
But the same person may be called as a witness by both parties. "No man can serve two masters, for either he will hate the
one and love the other, or else he. will hold to the one and despise
the other. Ye cannot serve God and mammon."' Whom of the
parties, both of whom call him in succession, will he be supposed
to favor? The one who first calls hin ? That would be an absurd test. "When," says Gibson C.J., "the testimony of a witness is required to establish a fact which is part of the plaintiff's
case, and also another fact which is part of the defense, it is
a .dictate of justice that no advantage be given to either party
in the manner of eliciting it. Bu*t an advantage is, in truth,
given, and for no adequate reason, when a party is allowed to
bring out his part of the case by cross-examination, [i.e., by
leading questions] merely because the opposite party had been
compelled to call the witness in the first instance." 2 It seems
then, that a witness will be supposed to have a bias in favor of
the plaintiff's success, in so far as that success turns on the testimony which he is called to deliver.for the plaintiff, and that as
to this he .may be cross-examined by leading questions by the
defendant; but to feel a bias in favor of defendant, as respects the
matter he is called to testify to for him, as to which he may be
cross-examined by the plaintiff; a somewhat ludicrous bipartisanship, which seems to be no partisanship at all.
The opposite party may be supposed to have the highest possible degree of bias against his antagonist. He can therefore be
examined as if he were being cross-examined: leading questions
may be put to him.' A corporation, being a party, its officers are
not i/bso facto, to be treated as a party. They cannot be called

'6 Matt. 24.
'Floyd vs. Bovard, 6 W. & S 75. Plaintiff calling the defendant as a witness, the defendant cannot develop his defence by cross-examination of himself and leading questions. He must wait till the case of the plaintiff is in
and then as a witness for himself, be examined in the normal way subject to cross-examination by the plaintiff. Corkery v. O'Neill 9 Super. 335.
Ellmaker v. Buckley, 16 S. & R., 72.
'Brubaker v. Taylor, 76 Pa. 83.
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under the evidence act of 1887 by the opposite party and examined
by leading questions, unless they are adverse or unwilling witnesses.' In a sheriff's interpleader between the claimant of the
goods and the execution plaintiff, the defendant in the execution
is not a "person whose interest is adverse" to the plaintiff. He
cannot be called by the plaintiff and cross-examined,' and in an
issue between two judgment creditors of X to determine whether
of one these judgments is fraudulent, X cannot be cross-examined,
not being a party to the issue.
There are times when a witness called by a party shows such
ingenuity and perverseness that it is necessary to probe him by
He may have previously testified or made
leading questions.'
declarations in a certain way, and when called upon the stand,
he may give a different version, or pretend to no recollection of
the matter. This may be deemed an indication of unwillingness
to tell the truth, and for that reason may subject the witness to
leading questions. It may, in particular, authorize the party
who has called him in reliance on his self-consistency, to minify
the force of his testimony by proving previous inconsistent declarations; and he can be interrogated in a leading way, in regard
to these earlier declarations. Thus, a teller of the defendant
bank, having said when called by the opposite party, what was
inconsistent with an earlier testimony, may be cross-examined as
to this, as may a subscribing witness to a will who now says the
testator was insane- or intoxicated," but in a former trial said he
was of sound mind.
Attorneys are in the habit, when it is practicable, of examining witnesses in advance of the trial, and of thus learning what
if called to the stand, they will be able and willing to swear to.
It is easy for a bold man thus to secure his being called to the
stand and then io avail himself of the opportunity to deal a lethal blow to the cause which he was expected to support. The surprised party may therefore show, not simply by other witnesses
'Grant v. Cox Co., 199 Pa. 208.
32Cohen v. Salsberg, 17 Super, 286.
Unangst v. Goodyear, 141 Pa., 127.
'Wogan
v. Small, , S. & R., 141.
5
Bank of Northern Liberties v. Davis, 6 W. & S., 285; Farmer's Ins.
Co. v. Bair, 87 Pa. 124.
'Harden v. Hays, 9 Pa. 151.
7
Cowden v. Reynolds, 12 S. & R., 281. Cf. Stearns v. Merchants' Bank,
53 Pa., 490. When the object is to show that any witness has made contradictory statements, it is proper to name, the time, place, person and put a
question to him, that in ordinary circumstances would be leading. Its object
being to expose a contradiction, the witness can hardly be suspected of desiring to please the questioner.
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but by means of leading questions, addressed to this witness,
what he had previously said. In a trespass to recover for-injuries arising from falling into an unguarded area-way, in a pavement, B, called in the expectation that he would say that the areaway was dangerous, did not express that opinion. He possibly
said the area -way was not dangerous. He was then asked, Do
you remember a conversation of the questioning counsel with T,
in which the former said to T, who desired to be excused from
testifying, we will call Mr. B, and leave you off.'
He said
"Yes. " He was then asked, "Do you not remember of saying
it was a dangerous place? - He said "No."
"It isapparent,"
says McCollum J., "that Boyer was an unwilling witness and
that his evidence was a surprise to the appellee who called him to
the stand. It was proper therefore for the learned trial judge, in
the exercise of the sound discretion which the law allows him in
such cases, to permit a cross-examination of the witness of the
party calling him, to show that his previous statements and conduct were at variance with his testimony. * * An appellate
court will not interfere with it unless clear and injurious error
appears."' If Fisher v. Hart' is to be taken literally, when the
disappointment consists in the witness' not saying on the stand
what he has said before and he does not contradict what he said
before, and there is no other evidence of his hostility, the crossexamination will not be allowed. The action was for injury from
the fall of a scaffold, and it was alleged that defendant, Hart,
superintended the construction of it. X was called by plaintiff
and asked "Did Hart superintend the construction of the scaffold?"
"I don't remember."
"Did you not tell me so yesterday?" VI don't remember."
"Did you not say to me yesterday afternoon as follows: "I did not superintend the construction
of this scaffold; Hart did that himself."
The answer to- this
question was probably affirmative. The judgment being against
Hart, the admission of the evidence was held to be error. "The
witness," says Sterrett J. "had not testified to anything prejudicial to the plaintiff, nor does it appear that he had manifested
any'bias. Without any further effort to refresh his memory than
is indicated in the foregoing questions, the plaintiff was permitted
to treat him as an adverse witness, and to propound by way of
cross-examination, the leading question complained of. The result of this was to put in the mouth of the witness the very alle'McNerney v. Reading City, i5o Pa., 6i. Cf. Grayv. Hartman, 6 Super
195-.ZFisher v. Hart, '49 Pa. 232.
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gations of fact which the plaintiff wished him to verify by an affirmative answer." This is very nearly saying that, if having
said a certain thing before being sworn, the witness stands mute
or says he does not remember, the party calling him, he not having
delivered any prejudicial testimony, cannot cross-examine him.
Cross-examination is allowed to destroy the effect of injurious
evidence, not to obtain favorable evidence unexpectedly withheld.
A witness may show by his manner, his petulance, impertinence, affected indifference, that he is unwilling to assist the
party who has called him and he may then be led by questions'.
The party who is to be adversely affected by the evidence
that will be elicited by the leading question must object to the
question, and he must specify its form as the ground of his objection. To object to it generally, is not enough, the reason being that the form might be easily modified, and perhaps substantially the same evidence educed by questions of unexceptionable
forhi. If the leading question is put at the taking of a deposition,
it must be objected to then, if the opposite party is present,' or if
having had notice of the taking of depositions, he for any reason,
has chosen not to be present.' It is too late to object at the trial in
which use of the deposition is proposed, and a general objection at
the deposal will probably be ineffectual, although at the trial, when
the questions and answers are offered, an objection specifying the
leading form of the question is made.5 Objection to the leading
form of the question made at the taking of the deposition, will
cause the answer to be excluded at the trial, if then insisted on.6
The deposition being taken to support d rule, the court at the
hearing will decline to consider an answer to a leading question
which had been properly objected to
"The rule that a party calling a witness is not permitted to
ask leading questions and is bound by his testimony is, says
Mitchell J., "liberally construed in modern practice, with a large
measure of discretion in the court to permit parties to elicit any
material truth without regard to the technical consideration of
who called the witness. It is a discretion not susceptible of exactly defined limits beforehand, but to be exercised in the inter'Farmers' Ins. Co. v. Bair, 87 Pa. 124; Wogan v. Small, ii S. & R. 141.
'Kemmerer v. Edelman, 23 Pa. 143; Logan v. McGinnis, 12 Pa. 27;
Corkery v. O'Neill, 9 Super 335. To exclude a leading question on a general objection, is not error. Seitz v. Seitz, 170 Pa. 71.
'Sheeler v. Speer, 3 Binn. 130; Strickler v. Todd, ioS. & R. 63.
4McKim v. Somers, i P. W. 297.
'Wilson v. McCullough, 23 Pa. 440.
"Summers
v. Wallace, 9 W. 161.
7
Bowman v. Bowman, r Pears. 465
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ests of justice and a fair trial under circumstances as they arise. "'
"The propriety of permitting certain questions to be asked depends," says Tilghman C.J., "so much on circumstances which
occur during the trial that a court of error should be extremely
cautious in reversing a judgment for any mistake in deciding on
that subject," 2 and an appellate court will not interfere with the
trial court's discretion "unless clear and injurious error appears."
In Ellmaker v. Buckley, 4 Gibson C.J. said he would not without
further consideration pronounce the exercise of the discretion
depending on circumstances that cannot be made to appear in the
appellate court, a legitimate subject of a bill of exceptions. It
is suggested by Paxson J.' that the appellate court may more
willingly reverse the judgment of the trial court for excluding
leading questions, than for permitting them, and he says he
knows of no reversal merely for permitting them. Several cases.
the upper court has reversed, one of the reasons being the admission of leading questions. In Snyder v. Snyder' and Fisher
v. Hart7 there was one other and in Susquehanna Coal Co. v..
Quick8 there were several other errors. When the leading question is put at the trial, and it is rejected, usually some other form
of question will bring out all that the party is entitled to get from
the witness. The rejection of a question therefore simply compels the adoption of another and non-leading form. The appellate court would therefore very ra.rely reverse unless convinced
that the question was under the circumstanees substantially
proper in form. 9 Though a court expresses a purpose to exclude
certain questions, it may afterwards receive the evidence. Whatever error there was in the temporary exclusion of the evidence
will thus be expunged. I If the answer in a deposition to a question, is rejected at the trial, and the appellate court thinks the
question was not leading, and the answer revelant, it will reverse.
The judgment might have been obtained in consequence of the
exclusion, of-evidence that ought to have been beard."
WILLIAm TRICKE'TT.

'Gantt v. Cox & Sons Co.,
1a4.

2

199

Pa. 214; Farmer's Ins. Co. v. Bair, 87 Pa.

Wogan v. Small, ii S.
& R. 141.
3

McNerney v. Reading City, 15o Pa. 611.

416 S. & R. 72.

McCollum J.

Farmers' Ins. Co. v. Bair, 8' Pa. i2A.
% Binnn..483.
T149 Pa, 232.

86i Pa. 3;28,
9In Neely v. Bair's Ex,, 157 Pa. 417, a judgment was affirmed though a
question had been excluded as leading. In Seitz v. Seitz, 170 Pa. 71, an as
signment of error to the exclusion of a question was overruled, because it
was leading and might for that reason have heen objected to, although
only a general objection was made.
"'Cohen v. Salsberg, 17 Super. 286,
"Summers v. Wallace, 9 W, x6i,
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MOOT COURT.
SLOANS' ESTATE.
The Collateral Inheritance Tax.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Sloan, the testator, died seised of certain parcels of real estate, some
situated in Pennsylvania, others in Maryland. In the will the executors were
directed to sell a part of the Maryland real estate and divide the proceeds
among certain brothers and sisters of the testator. Other parts of the Maryland land were devised directly to the Above beneficiaries, as was also some
of the land located in Pennsylvania. Before an auditor the question was
raised whether all of the above dispositions were subject to the Pennsylvania collateral inheritance tax law. Counsel for the brothers and sisters
contended not; the representatives of the state that the tax was due from all
of the dispositions.
Otto for the tax.
Kleeman for the estate.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
SHARMAN, J.:-The Act of May 6, 1887 P. L. 79, provides that all
estates, real, personal and mixed of every kind whatsoever, situated within
this state, whether the person or persons dying seized thereof be domiciled
within or out of this state and all such estates situated in another state,
territory or country, when the person or persons dying seized thereof shall
have their domicile within this commonwealth, which pass to collaterals,
shall be subject to the payment of collateral inheritance tax.
There was no disagreement, between counsel, in regard to the property
located in the state of Pennsylvania, being subject to collateral inheritance
tax, for a long line of decisions has recognized the right of the state to impose a tax of this nature upon the estate of a person, dying, leaving his
property to collateral heirs. The courts eagerly grasp a straw in order to impose this tax, a fair illustration being found in Vanuxem's Est., 21.2 Pa. 315.
Where a testator directs that property, located in another state, is to be
sold and converted into money, for the use of collaterals in this state, the
proceeds of such sale are subject to the collateral inheritance tax. This
contention is upheld by a number of decisions, in which the conversion was
directed by the will. Williamson's Est., 153 Pa. 508; Miller's Est., 182 Pa.
157; Coleman's Est., 19 Pa. 231; Lewis' Est., 203 Pa. 211.
Justice Paxson, in Hunt's and Lehman's Appeals, 1o5 Pa. 128, says that
there is a convers'on when there is, ist, a positive direction to sell; or 2d, an
absolute necessity to sell in order to execute the will; or 3 d, such a blending
of real and personal estate by the testator in his will as to clearly show that
he intended to create a fund out of both real and personal estate and to bequeath the said fund as money. In each of the two latter cases an intent
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to convert it will be implied.
This statment has been affirmed repeatedly.
Irwin v. Patchen, 164 Pa. 51; Sauerbier's Est., 202 Pa. 187; Rauch's Est., 21
Pa. Superior Court 6o; Vanuxem's Est. 212 Pa. 315.
That part of the property in Maryland, therefore, which he directed to
be sold, was converted into personalty and is drawn to the domicile of the
decedent and is subject to the tax. Handley's Est., 181 Pa. 339; Vanuxem's
Est., suifra.
The legislature, in attempting to impose a collateral inheritance tax upon real estate situated in another state, transcended the power of the state;
and although the testator gives the property to the collaterals in Pennsylvania, the property is notsubjectto the tax if it passes as realty. "It is a
direct tax upon the thing devised in the hands of the devisee, a tax which
the state is.powerless to enforce. The state cannot enforce extra-territorial
taxing power." Bittinger's Est., 129 Pa. 338; Drayton's Appeal. 61 Pa. 172;
Commonwealth v. Coleman's Adm'r. 52 Pa. 468; Vanuxem's Est., 2z Pa.,
315.
It follows, therefore, that the property located in Maryland, which was
devised directly to the beneficiaries in Pennsylvania, is not subject to the
Pennsylvania collateral inheritance tax.
The tax, therefore, will be assessed by the auditor in accordance with
the directions as above specified.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
The act of May 6th, 1887, 2 P. & L. 4485, provides for a collateral inheritance tax on (a) any estate in Pennsylvania, land or personalty, whether
the last owner was domiciled in this state or not, and (b) on "all such estates
situated in another state," if the last owner was domiciled in Pennsylvania.
Sloan was domiciled in Pennsylvania, at the time of his death. But, a tax
on the Maryland land would have transcended the power of this state and
would have been void. Bittinger's 4state, 129 Pa. 338.
The act of i88 7 undertakes to tax only estates whereof the deceased
"died se-ized." Sloan "died seized" of the land in Maryland, but not of the
price that was subsequently realized first by his executor. It ought to follow
that no inheritance tax upon the price is payable. The land of Maryland
would be subject to its death duty if,imitating Pennsylvania,it imposed aduty
on land within it although the deceased owner was domiciled in another state.
Cf. Thayer v. Commonwealth, 12 W. N. C. 553. This duty might be a lien
upon it. When the land was sold, the lien would be paid from the proceeds.
Then, if the proceeds are liable to a Pennsylvania tax, it is evident that the
legatees of the proceeds will have paid two inheritance taxes, one to Maryland and one to Pennsylvania. If the act of 1887 requires a tax on the proceeds of the Maryland land, it is probably a violation of the Constitution of
the'United States; for, distinguish land from tle money which its sale produces,"as we may, for Pennsylvania to tax the proceeds is virtually to tax the
land itself.
The cases are numerous however, in which it has been decided
that the inheritance tax can be imposed on the proceeds of land in other
states; Miller's Estate i8z Pa. 157; Miller v. Commonwealth iii Pa. 321
Williamson's Estate, 153 Pa. io8; Vanuxem's Estate 212 Pa. 314, and unanswerable as is the reasoning of Chief Justice Mitchell in his dissent from

THE FORUM
some of these decisions, the judgment of the court must prevail. The
legatees who are given the proceeds of the Maryland land must be as content as they tan, with the double inheritance taxation to which their bequests are subjected.
The appeal is dismissed.

COLLINS vs. TIMBER.
Conclusiveness of Judgment-Title of Findeis of Chattel.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
This is an action of replevin brought by William Collins, owner of
certain goods against John Timber, the finder of the chattels in question
after they had been lost by a depositary. The facts briefly stated were:
Timber had found the goods and was ignorant of their true owner.
While holding them they are claimed by one Adam Ferguson, who, being refused the goods, sues Timber for their value, recovers a judgment, and obtains
satisfaction by execution. Now after Timber has been compelled by process
of law to pay Ferguson for these chattels, Collins the owner of the goods steps
in and brings action of replevin to recover their possesion from the defendant.
Biglow, for plaintiff.
Kleeman, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
PAUL SMITH. J.-We are of the opinion that this action of Collins
against Timber cannnot be maintained,and that the decree of the Court giving
Ferfuson a judgment for their value and its subsequent satisaction is a bar
to any further action against the innocentfinder of the goods-John Timber.
There is no better settled principle of the law than that the finder of lost property has a right to retain it against all persons except the true owner and those
claiming under him. This rule as laid down in Armory vs. Delamirie, i
Strang 504 has become a known principle of our Common Law, and has
been universally recognized by the Courts of this state. In Hamaker vs.
Blanchard 90 Pa. 377, Mr. Justice Trunkey said, "It seems to be settled
law that the finder of lost property has a valid claim to the same against all
the world except the true owner." And in Tatum vs. Sharpless 6 Phila.
x8, it was held that the finder of a lost article acquires at most a special
property in the thing found, but he is the only person except the true owner
who can claim any title at law. A finder of a chattel could even maintain
action of trover against anyone who should convert it except against the
true owner, 90 Pa. 377 sujfra. And the possession of goods either rightfully
or wrongfully held, is considered a sufficient title in plaintiff as against a
mere stranger or wrongdoer, Asaph Knapp and John Worden vs. Martin
Winchester xi Vt. 35t; but.is not as against the real owner, Sylvester vs.
Girard 4 Rawle 185. From these principles of law we are forced to conclude that the defendant in this case, as finder of the goods would be able
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in a court of law-to maintain possession of the goods found as against any
body except the true owner or those claiming under him. No stranger, no
wrongdoer, no one not having some title in the goods could take them away
from him to recover their value if desired, on refusal to give them up. This
being so, the fact that Ferguson claimed the goods as his own and was able
to recover a judgment upon which he obtained satisfaction when he was refused them, shows conclusively that he must have shown some valid title to
them-at least title enough to convince the jury that he had a right to the
chattels in question. With this condition of affairs the defendant is certainly exonerated from further liability upon the goods. For what more
could Timber do. He could only plead that he was the finder of the lost
chattles. Then the burden of proof was on Ferguson to show that he was
the owner or claimed under him. And this Ferguson must have shown.
Again the defendant in this case, as finder of the goods, was a species
of depositary and was governed by the same general rules as a common depositary, Vale page 37 lie was a constructive bailee for the owner and
was responsible as such to him for the safe keeping of the article found,
Newhall vs. Page, to Gray (Mass.) 366. But if goods are taken from bailee
by the authority of law exercised through regular and val d proceedings the
bailee will be exonerated Edson vs. Weston 7th Cow. (N. Y.) 278, Stamford Steam Boat Co. vs. Gibbons 9 Wend (N. Y.) 327, 18 Vt. 186. In this
case at issue the defendant had been compelled by the authority of law
exercised through regular and valid proceedings, so far as we know, to pay for
the chattels, which amounts substantially to giving up the goods themselves
and thus the plaintiff will be barred in any action of replevin against the
defendant, Timber.
Judgment for defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
The goods did not, by Timber's finding them, become his. Ferguson
claiming them, sued him for their value and recovered it. In this action it
was necessary as the learned court below holds, that he should prove to the
satisfaction of the jury, that he was the owner, and he evidently did thus
prove that he was, for he obtained a verdict and a judgment; and later, satisfaction of the judgment. As between Timber and Feiguson, this judgment and satisfaction made the goods Timber's. Having paid under judgment the value of them, such ownership as Ferguson had had, passed to
Timber.
But what caused Collins' ownership to pass? Collins was not a party
to the suit, and obtained no compensation for the goods. Why th'en should
he lose them? Is he responsible for Timber's having-to pay for them? He
might possibly have been made responsible. Had Timber known that they
were his, he might possibly have called in Collins to defend, and thus bound
Collins by the result. He did not do this. Collins so far as appears had no
knowledge of the action. He was guilty of no laches, no estopping acts or
negligences.
It is a fundamental principle to which there are few exceptions that the
judgment in a litigation between A and B, will not be available to either of
them, in a litigation between A and C, or between B and C.
It is true that Ferguson had to prove to the satisfaction of the jury that
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tried his case. that he was the owner of the goods. But Collins is not responsible for that satisfaction. He may have had plenty of evidence to
convince the jury that the goods were his and not Ferguson's, but he had
no opportunity to present it. Why should he lose his property because
Timber was less able, or less willing than he would have been, to refute the
pretensions of Ferguson ?
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.

GIBBS V. DETWOLD.
Contract to Convey Land. Imperfect Title.
Thompson for plainttiff.
Wallis for defendant.
OPINION OF COURT.
SMITH R. E., J.-This is an action in assumpsit to recover the
purchase money on a contract to convey a fee simple title to the property in
dispute. The defense is, that John Gibbs ,the plaintiff in this action, cannot
convey a good title-not possessing a feu simple. A fee simple may be created by will without using the word heirs. In construing the will the sole
purpose is to ascertain the intention of the testator. There is some confusion between deeds and wills. The reason for the distinction is this: the
deed is an instrument between the living, and the grantor still may have
some interest in the land. On the other hand where the will is made it takes
effect only upon the death of the testator. He has no interest in the propety and c6nsequently the Court will not presume that he intended to retain
any interest in the land. When it is the case of a deed, the Court would not
wish to take away any interest that the man intended to keep in the land.
To create an estate in fee simple by deed at Common Law, the deed
must contain the words "to have and to hold to himself and his heirs"; these
words were necessary at Common Law. The words "to have and to hold"
created a life estate merely. The word "heirs" was necessary.-Taylor v.
Taylor, 63 Pa. 481.
The ruling in Shelly's case turns upon this point. Tfhe rule is simply to
determine in what sense the word "heirs" was used. It was absolutely necessary to use them to create the estate in fee simple. You want to grant the
land to A and his heirs. In that case you would have to use the word "heirs.'
If you want to grant a fee simple you would have to use the same words.
The rule in Shelly's case was to determine in which sense the word was
used; whether it was a word of purchase or a word of limitation.
"The rule briefly stated is this: when by deed or will an estate in land
is given to one for life and at his death the remainder to his heirs in fee, the
estate of the life tenant is enlarged .o a fee; the two estates are merged in
one, and the first takes the whole. This rule is firmly established as law in
Pennsylvania."-Carson v. Fuhs, 131 Pa. 256.
The words 'heirs' and 'heirs of the body' being words of limitation and
not of purchase, the law presumes them to be used in their legal sense, not
to indicate individuals, but quantity of estate, and descent. The onus of
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rebutting this legal presumption and of showing that they are words of pur.
chase and used to indicate individuals, is on him who affirms it; and when
this is clearly and plainly manifest, the rule is inapplicable.- Guthrie's Appeal, 37 Pa. o.
The Courts are more liberal in the construction of the words of a will
than those of a deed. It is not material what words the testator has used if
it is clear what his intention was. When there is a controversy as to whether
the testator intended to leave merely a life estate or a fee simple, the qoestion usually turn's upon this:
Does the will describe merely the land itself or does it describe hoth the
land and the testator's estate in the land? In order to determine that question we turn to the will and try to discover what he has given. If the devisor
describes the mere parcel of land, then the devisee takes a life interest and
a life interest only. If the will describes the land and the estate which the
testator has in it, then the devisee takes the estate. If there are no words
in the will describing the estate, but from the whole will it appears that the
testator intended to devise more than a life interest or that such estate is
essential to the other provisions of the will, then the will will be held to pass
the interest which the testator had. The general rule as laid down in Campbell v. Carson 12 S. & R. 54, is that in every case where the testator devises
land, his intention is to give the whole interest he possesses. And the holding of the Court as set forth in Welsh v. Allen 21 Wendell 147 is that the
fee vests whenever it is necessary that it should in order to carry out the
testator's intention. " No one can create what in law is a fee and deprive
the tenant of those essential rights and privileges which the law annexes to
it. If the testator expressly declare that the rule shall not apply, that the
devisee shall not sell or alienate, but shall have but a life estate, this will not
prevent the operation of the rule."-Doebler's Appeal 64 Pa. 9.
The rule does not operate where one estate is legal and the other equittable.-Myers' Appeal 44 Pa. 'i i.
In the case at bar, we are of the opinion that the rule in Shelly's case
will apply, it appearing that it was the intention of the testator to dispose of
the estate he then held and that it is essential to the other provisions.
Judgment for plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
William Gibbs' will contains the words " I give my mansion to my be.
loved son John for his life. It shall not be liable for his debts, nor shall he
dispose of it, and at his death it shall go to his heirs unless he shall devise
it to others, which I hereby empower him to do "
The testator evidently intended the mansion to become John's for life,
and at his death, to pass to his "heirs," or devisees. The rule in Shelly's
case operates in precisely such a case. It defeats the intention of the testator that the first taker shall take but a life estate, whenever, after the life
estate, the designated successors are "heirs."
The testator expressly authorizes a devise by the life-tenant. But this
power to devise would be the result of the operation of the rule in Shelly's
case. That rule would convert the life estate into a fee, and the fee would
be devisable.
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The provision for non-liability for debts does not come into contest.
No creditors are seeking to take the house.
The provision that John shall not dispose of the house, if valid, would
preclude Detwold's obtaining a good title, and he therefore could not be
compelled to pay the purchase money. But restraints on the power of alienation for long periods, are void. This restraint is void, if John has a fee
simple. It does indicate that the testator intended the mansion house not
to be disposable by John by a conveyance, but such intention is partially embraced already in the intention that he shall have only a life estate. The
only difference between a life-tenant and all owner in fee. is, the presence in
one case, and the absence in the other, of the tenant's power to determine
who (after his death) shall have the land. When a life-tenant can determine, in the three ways known to the law, viz: permitting to remain under
the intestacy system, devising and conveying, who shall take. he is no longer
a life-tenant, but a tenant in fee. The effect of the rule in Shelly's case is
to defeat the results that grants or wills would often produceJudgment affirmed.

ALLEN vs. CUMBERLAND VALLEY RAILROAD COMPANY.
Duty of Railroad Company to carry the Blind.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
The plaintiff, a blind man, seventy-two years of age, and accompanied
by an attendant sought to purchase a ticket for a railway journey from Carlisle to Washington, D. C., involving several changes of cars. The defendant's agent refused to sell it to him unless an attendant went with him upon
the journey, to which demand the plaintiff refused to accede. Present action
is for damages sustained for refusal to sell ticket unconditionally.
Thompson, for plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
BIGELOW, J.-Circumstances are often a determining factor in the
right of a refusal to do that which one is generally bound to do. There appears
to be no good reason why an individual cannot refuse to burden himself with
responsibility beyond what is required by law. Law has regulated the duty
of one toward another and in the -absence of law applicable to a case justice
must be secured by reason. Duty from the standpoint of the law (and by
such it is regulated, in business life) is the same between parties as between
individuals and corporations. the controlling principle being a just and equal
share of obligations. Railroad companies may generally be bound to receive all who apply as passengers, but this rule appears to be altogether too
broad; in fact to such an extent that already an exception has been made to
the extent of barring those who are notoriously bad or justly suspicious persons, drunk or immoral persons or those who refuse to obey the rules of the
company. In every case it appears to be a case of protection to the passen.
gers already accepted. Since the Railroad Co. can so control its acceptance
of passengers, for the protection of those already accepted, why can it not
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control its acceptance of those who, by their acceptance, throw twon the Railroad (o. additional responsibility in regard to the care to be exercised in their
safe transit? This is what must result from the acceptance of a blind man,
seventy-two years of age. Or why can it not refuse to accept one in order
to protect itself? Does it not appear that the acceptance of this man
throws upon the company additional care and obligation? Does this
man give the company any assurance other than the bare circumstances
of his application for a ticket, that he can care for himself to the extent that the law requires? We think not. One, if not the main controlL
ing element, in the ability of one to take care of himself, is the possession
of the sense of sight. Deprived of it, one is almosthd-lpless to care for himself in a public place. The court believes the question determining the decision in the case to be: Is the blind man capable of exercising that degree
of care or diligence, which all passengers are ordinarily bound to exercise by
law? If he is not so capable the company is not bound to accept him, upon
the principle that it is not bound to accept greater responsibility than
the law requires it should assume. What is the physical and mental capacity of a blind man, seventy-two years of age? Ordinarily a man seventytwo years of age is considered in the light 9f infancy inso faras his physical
capacity is concerned, and in a large measure his mental capacity. Deprived of these wholly or partially, coupled with his loss of vision he appears almost helpless. If the law excuses in case of drunkenness viz: gross
intoxication, many in such state being able to care for themselves, is it not
a gross imposition upon the rights of anyone to have foisted upon him a
helpless and blind individual? By the acceptance of this individual a double
share of responsibility appears to be assumed by the Railroad Company
which at no time should it be subject to. Another circumstance indicating the incompetency of the man appears in the fact that he was accompanied to the station by a boy, indicatinr that a guardian was necesary to
his safety, but it does not appear that the boy was to accompany the man on
the trip. In fact it appears that the boy or guardian was not to so accompany
the man, and refused to accede to the company's demand that he do so. If
the guardian was necessary to the safety and preservation of the man in accompanying him to the stati ,n, why was he not necessary to further accompany him upon his journey, embodying as it does greater danger from the accompanying change of cars, use of sleeper or dining car perhaps, and other
incidentals necessary to traveling which passengers are subject to? Must it
be expected of a Railroad Company to pay wholly to this man the attention
of an employee in order to assure his safe arrival at his destination? This
would mean in a measure a decrease of attention to fellow passengers to
whom the company is in duty bound to pay such attention as the ordinary
convenience requires. Again there may have been a rule or regulation of
the company to the effect that, such passengers may be refused except when
accompanied on the journey by an attendant. In the absence of any statute
in Pennsylvania, compelling the company to accept such a person as a passenger, is it reasonable to say that such a rule if made by a Railroad Company is unlawful or unjust? We think not. The doctrine of self protection
is as applicable to a Railroad Company as to an individual, both answering
to the court for the abuse of their privilege.
In the absence of any legislation upon the matter at issue in Pennsylvania, the court orders a non suit.
Plaintiff non suited.
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OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
A railroad being a common carrier, is bound to receive persons who
offer themselves for carriage, complying with its reasonable regulations. It
cannot capariciously accept A and reject B. It is not suffered to show favoritism. It does not follow that it must accept and carry any body that seeks.
It may discriminate against those who do not pay, against those who do not
pay and obtain tickets before entering the car; against thosd having contagious diseases, or who are in a filthy and repulsive condition; against those
whose object is unlawful; or whose conduct at the station or upon the train
is noisy and turbulent.
Allen was seventy-two years of age. For that reason alone, surely he
could not be refused transportation. To require such a man to be attended
would be often to forbid his passage altogether. Securing an attendant
would be so difficult, so expensive, as often to preclude travel at all. Many
men at seventy-two are strong, vigorous, alert, and quite able to take care
of themselves. There is no evidence what effect the years of Allen had had
upon his general health and strength. It would be cruel to exclude such a
person from the opportunity to travel on a train, perhaps to visit a sick
child, perhaps to go to get needed recreation, perhaps to seek employment,
perhaps to prosecute a vocation, perhaps to return home after a sojourn
elsewhere, simply because of his age. It may he that he could not walk as
fast, nor as firmly as a younger person. But there are degrees of celerity
and vigor among younger people. and no rule allows the railroad company
to insist that only the swiftest and surest of foot shall be accepted as passengers. Can the company refuse carriage to women because they are not
as agile and self-helpful as men? If the line may be drawn at seventy-two,
may it be drawn atsixty-two or fifty-two? A reasonable rule does not make
years alone the test of transportability.
Allen was blind. Was his blindness an adequate cause for refusing him
a ticket? Let it be conceded that he would need assistance. He would
have to be guided to the railway carriage steps, assisted up, and shown to a
seat. He would need aid to dismount at the place of stopping, and to mount
on the other train by which his journey was to continue, Some of this aid
he could count on obtaining from gentlemen who should become aware that
he was in need of it. There is enough good feeling and kindness abroad to
make it certain that men who were cognizant of his situation would assist
him . The servants of the company are appointed in part, to assist passengers, and the charges of transportation have included the cost of their employment. It would be absurd to say that no passenger has a right to more
than the attention which all the other passengers receive. Women receive
more than men, weak or aged men, more than strong or young men. The
principle would be impracticable, that no person may become a passenger
who will need and obtain more attention from the railway servants than the
average passenger.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi has decided that the refusal to sell a
ticket to a blind man, offering to buy, is not justifiable whether in the absence of a regulation of the company; Zachery v. Mobile & C. R. Co. 36 L
R. A. 546 or in pursuance of such regulation. Zackery v. Mobile & C. R. R.
41 L. R. A. 385.
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That an attendant was with Allen when he sought to buy a ticket is not
proof of his inabilityto travel alone. The service of the attendant may have
been volunteered, or even forced by friends on Allen. The attendant may
have been a relative or friend whose accompanying Allen was not an expression of his inability safely to order his own going. The difficulties of
reaching the station may have been exceptional, and far greater than those
which would beset Allen after he got aboard the train.
It would have heen necessary for Allen to make several changes of cars.
But the Cumberland Valley Railroad Co. would have discharged its full duty
towards him, when it put him safely from its train. That he should get
safely on another train would interest its servants as men, but no liability
arises, from a sale of a ticket to Washington, for any mishap to Allen that
might happen after he left the initial railroad's cars.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.
COMMONWEALTH vs. FORNEY.
Selling Liquor Without License-Place of Sale.

STATEMENT OF CASE.
This was a motion for a new trial. The defendant was found guilty on
all of the four counts in the indictment charging with selling liquor without
a license. The counts were as follows: (a). To persons from whom he
merely obtained the order, (b) to persons from whom he got orders and to
whom he subsequently delivered the beer, (c) to persons from whom he
merely received payments, (d) to persons from whom lie had taken the
orders and subsequently received payment, the beer havingbeen shirped by
rail.
The facts of the case are as follows: The defendant was employed by
one Win. Emerick to travel through Cumberland County and solicit orders
for beer of which Emerick was a bottler in Franklin County, having a
license from the court of that county. To some of the persons who ordered
the beer it was sent to the Emerick establishment by railroad. To others
it was carried in a wagon by Torrey and delivered by him.
OPINION OF COURT.
TEMKO, J.-One, who merely solicits as agent orders for liquors outside of the county in which his principal is licensed, and subsequently collects the price, cannot be convicted of selling liquors without a license,
where there is no proof that he actually delivered the liquor or agreed to do
so. This is the law as found in P. & L. Digest of decisions Col. 19329
and maintained in the following cases: Garbracht v. Comm., 96 Pa. 449,
Hess v. Comm., 148 Pa. 98; Comm. v. Flemming, 130 Pa. 138.

In Garbracht v. Comm., B, a traveling agent for A, a licensed liquor
dealer, doing business in Erie County, solicited and received orders for
whiskey in Mercer County. The orders were transmitted to A in Erie and
the whiskey was shipped by him by freight or express. consigned to the
parties, respectively from whom the orders were obtained. B was indicted
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in Mercer County for selling liquor without a license and was tried, convicted and sentenced. On appeal, it was held, (a) that he was improperly
convicted, as Erie County was the place of delivery and in law the sales
were made there and not in Mercer County, (b) that a person holding a
bottlers license may sell to any retail dealer, in any part of the Commonwealth, provided, that the sales are made at the bottler's place of business,
in the county for which.his license is granted.
If Torrey, the plaintiff in error, had done nothina more than what is
alleged in the first, third, and fourth counts, a new trial should be granted
as a verdict finding him guilty of selling liquors without a license cannot be
sustained. The law protects such a sale of liquor. It clothes the licensee
with power to make such sales by designating the place of sale where the
liquor is set aside for delivery to a common carrier and not the place where
the order is taken or the price collected.
This brings us to the question: whether the conviction upon the second
count can be sustained. This is really the vital point in the case. From
this count we learn, that Emerick not only solicited orders but he delivered
the beer in a wagon to some of the persons from whom he had taken orders.
"An agent or an employee of a licensed dealer, who takes orders in a
locality to which his license does not extend and delivers the liquor to the
persons ordering it in such locality is guilty of selling liquor without a
license." Stewart v. Comm., 17 Pa. 378; Holstein v. Comm., 132 Pa. 357;
Comm. v. Speck, x C. C. (Pa.) 633; Comm. v. Smith, 16 C. C. (Pa.) 644.
In Comm. v. Holstein, the defendant was the driver of a delivery wagon
of C., a licensed bottler, having his place of business in Philadelphia. He
took orders and delivered in Montgomery County. He was found guilty of
selling liquor without a liscense in the latter county. It was held that the
sale was made in Montgomery County, and the driver, being protected by
his employer's license only where the employer himself would be protected,
was properly convicted.
In Stewart v. Comm., the defendant who was agent for a licensed distillery doing business at a distance, solicited and received orders and money for
liquors by the gallon and after the orders were filled by the distiller to whom
they were addressed, delivered the packages containing the liquors to the
persons ordering, and this was held to be a sale where the packages were
delivered and not the place where the distillery was located.
In the case before us, Torrey in taking orders and delivering beer to
persons giving him the orders executed a sale at the place of delivery and
this being in a county not covered by the license of his employer, it was a
direct violation of the act of May T3, 1887. P. & F. t 13.
The verdict as to the first, third and fourth counts is set aside and the
motion for a new trial is refused on the ground that the verdict on the second count is sustained and that the defendent was guilty of selling liquor
without a license in Cumberland County.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Torrey has been convicted of selling beer in Cumberland County without a license. If he sold he sold for Emerick who was licensed to sell in
Franklin but not in Cumberland. Torrey is charged, first, with selling, in
that he merely obtained orders for beer, which he transmitted to Emerick.

24

THE FORUM

This surely was not a sale. No ownership of beer passed from or to anybody
by it. The reception and transmission of the order, worked no change in
the ownership or possession of any beer. A conviction on this count was
improper.
The second count charges that Torrey received orders from a certain
person, forwarded them to Emerick, for the purpose of delivering it, in response to the orders, and delivered it accordingly to the orders. It does not
appear whether the beer had been set apart in Franklin to the orderer, and
sent to Torney simply for delivery. It would be difficult to hold that Torrey
would, in that case, have made a sale. Emerick would have made it when
he separated some of hisbeerfrom the rest, designating it for the orderer, and
put it on the cars, consigned to Torrey simply as an agent for delivering
and not for sale. While, firimafacie, the place of delivery may be the place
of sale, it is not necessarily so. There can be delivery before sale, or sale
before delivery. The sale is made when the ownership passes from the former owner to another, and this passing does not need to wait until there has
been a delivery. It seems that Emerick had two methods of delivering beer.
Sometimes he by railroad consigned directly to the buyer. Sometimes he
consigned to Torrey for delivery to the buyer. It does not appear
that more was ever sent to Torrey than had been ordered; or that Torrey
had any option to do otherwise than deliver specified parcels to specified
persons. He could no more be indicted for selling beer, under these circumstances, than could a railroad company by which beer had been consigned to buyers, and whose only duty was to deliver the beer.
The third charge was founded on Torrey's receiving payment -forbeer
from certain persons; and transmitting it to Emerick. The sale had already
been made. Making payment on a past purchase is not buying, and receiving such payment is not selling.
The fourth charge is that Torrey having received and transmitted orders
for beer, which Emerick had forwarded directly to the orderers, subsequently
collected the money from the buyers. These acts were doubtless conducive
to the business of selling beer, but they were not sales.
Sentlence reversed.

